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The Hollowing Out of Corporate Canada:
Implications for Transnational Labor Law,
Policy and Practice
HARRY ARTHURSt
INTRODUCTION

In the late 1990s, Jim Atleson and I taught parallel seminars on the effect of globalization on labor law, and arranged for our students-Canadians and Americans-to interact with each other. On one occasion, we set them to negotiating a collective agreement covering the North American auto industry. Students were assigned roles as the
leaders or legal advisors of the U.S. and Canadian autoworkers' unions, and as executives or legal advisors of the
American parent companies and their wholly-owned Canadian subsidiaries. We wanted them to comprehend the similarities and differences between the labor laws of our two
countries, the difficulties of complying simultaneously with
related but noncongruent legal regimes, and the conflicts of
laws issues raised by applying domestic labor law to transnational relationships. We also wanted them to understand
the problems posed not only by adversarial relations as between management and labor, but by serious divergences of
interest and ideology within the ranks of each side.
They learned quickly. An e-mail sent by the American
management team to its Canadian counterpart accused the
latter of not role-playing in accordance with the assumpt
University Professor Emeritus and President Emeritus, York University,
Toronto. This text was originally prepared for a conference held in honor of
James Atleson on the occasion of his retirement from the University at Buffalo
Law School, State University of New York, and the twenty-fifth anniversary of
the publication of his ground-breaking book, Values and Assumptions in
American Labor Law. It retains its original purpose of honoring Atleson's
unique contribution to the field of labor law and its original character as a text
prepared for oral presentation. However, it has been extensively revised in light
of subsequent political and economic developments, and to provide references
that will lead readers back to places where I have provided a fuller exposition of
the points made. I am grateful for the editorial and research assistance provided
by Claire Mumm6.
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tions of the exercise. "You work for us," said the American
team, "You are not supposed to take independent positions."
With these dozen words, Jim's students provided important
insights into the state of corporate Canada, the way in
which corporate governance and structures influence human resources or industrial relations outcomes, and the
prospects for transnational labor regulation. Perhaps they
also revealed something about how these outcomes are
shaped within each country.
Parenthetically, this was not just a case of life imitating
art. In 1967, in defiance of a great deal of international and
domestic law-and arguably the law of gravity-Chrysler
Corporation and the United Auto Workers (UAW) signed
just such a transnational collective agreement.' This reminds us that if we are to understand how transnational
legal norms are established, enforced, and ultimately eviscerated, we have to look beyond legal texts at the structures, processes, and understandings of key actors, especially corporations.

I. THE STATE OF CORPORATE CANADA
For better or worse, we are all of us linked on a food
chain to corporations. The politics, prosperity, social wellbeing, and cultural life of Buffalo and Hamilton, Chicago
and Toronto, Houston and Calgary, are very much defined
by the nature, strength, and organization of their corporate
communities. This is true in the obvious sense that corporations employ people, pay taxes, and contribute to local charities. It is also true in the less obvious sense that cities with
head offices not only play a special role in the national and
global economy, but generate a particular type of local prosperity and influence. Head offices generate a demand for
accounting, advertising, design, financial, legal, and R & D
services; and aggregations of these service providers in turn
provide a market for high-end real estate, consumer goods,
and culture. Conversely, the absence of head offices makes
it very difficult to sustain any of the above.
Hence the phenomenon I have labeled "the hollowing
1. David H. Blake, Multi-National Corporation,International Union and
International Collective Bargaining:A Case Study of the Political, Social and
Economic Implications of the 1967 U.A. W-Chrysler Agreement, in
TRANSNATIONAL INDUsTRIAL RELATIONS

137 (Hans Guinter ed., 1972).
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out of Corporate Canada"-the dwindling importance, affluence, and influence of the Canadian business community
within the increasingly integrated economic space of North
America.2 Hollowing out has had a controversial history
since I identified this phenomenon in the 1990s. Its very
existence has been denied by several studies (the focus
andlor methodologies of which were problematic, I would
argue).3 It has been welcomed as a sign that Canada is attracting foreign investment and adapting to the new realities of globalization.4 It has been totally ignored by some
(but not all) leading Canadian nationalists.5 And it has been
both applauded by bank presidents and influential business
columnists, and damned by senior corporate executives and
respectable economists.6
Hollowing out did not begin with the original CanadaU.S. Free Trade Agreement of 1989 or with the advent of

2. Harry W. Arthurs, The Hollowing Out of Corporate Canada?, in
GLOBALIZING INSTITUTIONS:

CASE STUDIES IN REGULATION AND INNOVATION 29

(Jane Jenson & Boaventura de Sousa Santos eds., 2000).
3. See, e.g., MICHAEL GRANT & MICHAEL BLOOM, CONFERENCE BOARD OF
CANADA, "HOLLOWING OUT"--MYTH AND REALITY (2008); David Cavett-Goodwin,

The Hollowing Out of Corporate Canada-Quantitative vs. Qualitative Analysis
(Sept. 2008) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Carleton University) (on file with
author).
4.

See, e.g.,

DESMOND BECKSTEAD & W. MARK BROWN, STATISTICS CANADA,

HEAD OFFICE EMPLOYMENT IN CANADA, 1999 TO 2005 (2006); John R. Baldwin &

W. Mark Brown, Foreign Multinationals and Head Office Employment in
Canadian Manufacturing Firms (Statistics Canada, Economic Analysis
Research Paper Series Catalogue No. 11F0027MIE, No. 034, 2005); John R.
Baldwin & Wulong Gu, Global Links: Multinationals, Foreign Ownership and
Productivity Growth in Canadian Manufacturing (Statistics Canada, The
Economy in Transition Series Catalogue No. 11-622-MIE, No. 009, 2005).
5. For example, the Council of Canadians has shown no interest in the
issue. However, other nationalists have taken it up. See MEL HURTIG, THE
VANISHING COUNTRY: IS IT Too LATE TO SAVE CANADA? (2003); Mel Watkins,
Hollowing Out,
CAN.
DIMENSIONS,
Jan.-Feb.
2008,
available at
http://canadiandimension.com/articles/2008/01/1 1/1526.
6. Harry W. Arthurs, Constitutionalizing Neo-Conservatism and Regional
Economic Integration: TINA x 2, in ROOM TO MANOEUVRE? GLOBALIZATION AND
POLICY CONVERGENCE 17 (Tom Courchene ed., 1999); Daniel Schwanen,
Constitutionalizing Neo- Conservatism and Regional Economic Integration:
Comments, in ROOM TO MANOEUVRE? GLOBALIZATION AND POLICY CONVERGENCE,

supra, at 75.
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NAFTA in 1993, 7 though these treaties certainly accelerated
and institutionalized the process. Rather, hollowing out is
the result of six long-term trends, all driven by the logic of
North American economic integration. First, the United
States-now more than ever-is Canada's dominant source
of investment capital, our only significant export market,
and an influential supplier of ideas about government policy, business organization, legal practice, employment relations, and much else.8 Second, over the years, many important Canadian enterprises have been sold to Americanbased transnational corporations (TNCs).9 Third, American
investors and businesses have been willing and able to expand into sectors of the Canadian economy where foreign
ownership or participation was previously restricted or
banned.'" Fourth, many leading Canadian corporations have
been moving significant management functions abroad, or
reinventing themselves as American companies. Fifth, in
several sectors, leading Canadian companies have been hiring senior managers from the United States, some of whom
in effect manage by remote control, from their American
home base. And finally, recent changes in the corporate
strategy and structure of American transnationals have reduced the autonomy of their Canadian subsidiaries and the
range and importance of the corporate functions they con7. North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992,
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993); Canada-United States: Free-Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.,
Dec. 22, 1987-Jan. 2, 1988, 27 IL.M. 281.
8. The United States is Canada's primary export market, accounting for
78.97% of total Canadian exports in 2007, as opposed to the 2.84% accounted for
by the United Kingdom, Canada's second highest export destination. The United
States is also Canada's leading import source, with 54.21% of total imports
originating in the United States in 2007, compared with 9.41% from China, the
second highest import contributor. See Trade Data Online, http://www.ic.gc.ca/
scmrkti/tdst/tdo/tdo.php#tag (last visited Apr. 12, 2009).
9. For instance, MacMillan Bloedel was purchased by Weyerhaeuser in
1999, Eaton's was sold to U.S. Sears, Roebuck and Co. in 2000, the Hudson's
Bay Company was sold to Jerry Zucker, a U.S. investor, in 2006, and Stelco, the
steel giant, was acquired by U.S. Steel in 2007.
10. For example, Cerberus, an American financial institution played a
leading role in the recent abortive takeover of BCE Enterprises, Canada's
leading telecommunications company. Jacquie McNish et al., Cerberus Woos
Shaw, CanWest in Bid for BCE, GLOBE & MAIL, May 18, 2007, at B1. Airlines,
banks, newspapers, and television companies have been sheltered by various
means from American control.
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duct in Canada."
This last type of hollowing-out, though the least visible,
has the potential to be the most influential, especially in the
area of employment relations. Here is what seems to be
happening: in order to achieve economies of scale, take advantage of new information technologies, and operate effectively in global markets, TNCs have moved to more closely
integrate or control their various units. As a result, Canadian subsidiaries of American firms have been transformed.
No longer are they semi-autonomous "miniature replicas" of
the U.S. parent firm, producing a wide range of goods or
services specifically for Canadian consumption." Now, they
are often assigned more specialized functions and narrower
mandates, and produce for global or regional markets. No
longer are they widely-held publicly-traded corporations
listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange. Now they have become wholly-owned subsidiaries of their parent firm. Their
previous high-profile Canadian boards have been disbanded. Now their Canadian executives have been stripped
of much of their authority and autonomy, and often report
directly to American line managers. And many corporate
functions such as finance, advertising, and legal affairs
have departed Canadian head offices. Now they reside at
global head offices in Chicago or New York.
Consequently, the CEOs, senior executives, and IR/HR
managers of Canadian subsidiaries no longer enjoy the status or power they once did. If they exist at all, they may
lack the authority to make important decisions on their
own; and if they retain that authority, they may find themselves working within a framework of company policies formulated abroad, and reporting to senior managers who have
little familiarity with or concern for Canadian conditions.
For those who believe that all corporate action is determined by a single inexorable logic of efficiency and profit,
this change in the decision-making processes of Canadian
subsidiaries is of no consequence. Whoever makes the decisions, wherever they are made, however they are formulated, they are bound to come out more or less the same.
However, for those who believe that business decisions are
11. See generally Arthurs, supranote 2.
12. See Isaiah A. Litvak, The Marginalizationof Corporate Canada, BEHIND
Winter 2000-2001, at 1; Isaiah A. Litvak, U.S. Multinationals:
Repositioning the CanadianSubsidiary, 3 Bus. CONTEMP. WORLD 111 (1990).
HEADLINES,
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to some degree contingent, even contestable, then the structures and processes of corporate governance, and the identity and location of decision-makers, may indeed shape outcomes to a significant extent.
The hollowing out hypothesis obviously aligns with the
latter view of corporate governance. The purpose of this Essay is to propose a number of hypotheses as to what hollowing out might imply for industrial relations and labor law in
Canada and more generally. These hypotheses are, I confess, supported by only modest and often anecdotal evidence. Much more research is clearly needed. 3
II. TEN HYPOTHESES CONCERNING THE EFFECT OF
HOLLOWING OUT ON CORPORATE BEHAVIOR

4

Hypothesis one: Corporate behavior is determined not
only by the impersonal logic of the market place, but by the
way in which that logic is mediated by the understandings,
assumptions, values, and interests of individual corporate
decision-makers. These decision-makers-even when acting
in text-book fashion to maximize the interests of the corporation-may well disagree amongst themselves about how
to do so. Because of their differences and disagreements, it
matters a great deal who has what influence on which decisions.
Hypothesis two: TNCs often have a national character
that affects the outlook and analytical approach of their key
decision-makers. This is true in several senses. TNCs have
a national character because they are chartered by a particular country, and their governance structures are designed
13. Several years ago I wrote the distinguished CEO of a Canadian bank
congratulating him on his speech expressing great concern about the
consequences of hollowing out and proposing that his bank should either provide
funds to support research on the subject or undertake such research through its
own research department. "More research" he replied, "would just confuse
matters." By contrast, for an exemplary effort to develop such evidence, see
JACQUES B9LANGER ET AL., EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES IN MULTINATIONAL
COMPANIES IN CANADA: BUILDING ORGANIZATIONAL CAPABILITIES & INSTITUTIONS
FOR INNOVATION (2006).

14. Some of these hypotheses about corporate governance have been explored
in greater detail in Harry W. Arthurs & Claire Mummd, From Governance to
PoliticalEconomy: Insights from a Study of Relations Between Corporationsand
Workers, 45 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 439 (2007).
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to conform to (or avoid) its laws. Their dominant shareholders and creditors, core functions and facilities, and primary
markets are often situated within that same country. Typically, many board members and key executives have been
educated, recruited, and trained there as well. For all of
these reasons, the political economy and business culture of
that country tend to influence the way corporate actors see
the world and react to it. Moreover, many of the principal
providers of business services to TNCs-bankers, lawyers,
consultants, advertising agencies, auditors-also tend to be
located near the firm's head office, to have been brought up
in the same business culture, and to share a similar worldview.
Hypothesis three: TNCs exercise considerable influence
wherever they do business. They are obviously important
economic actors. They invest money, raise capital, employ
workers and managers, buy goods and services, and sell
products. They are therefore also important political actors.
They negotiate with host countries over the terms of their
access to markets, and the outcomes of these negotiations
ultimately depend upon or are translated into trade treaties, foreign ownership regulations, public procurement programs, and other public policies to which their own and foreign governments become formally committed. Moreover,
TNCs expect host countries to ensure that their competition, environmental, and labor policies are businessfriendly, to provide infrastructure and subsidies, and to legitimate business initiatives through symbolic and practical
gestures. When other interests-such as those of laborclash with the interests of business, TNCs expect host governments to mediate the clash, or to step aside and allow
them to resolve the dispute on their own terms. Finally, as
noted earlier, TNCs are important actors in civil society in
both home and host countries: they shape urban skylines,
provide funds for cultural institutions and universities, act
as role models for employment and business practices, and
contribute the time and influence of their officers and directors to civic causes.
Hypothesis four: The origin, governance structures, and
internal policies of TNCs doing business in a given country
or community are therefore important determinants of local
economic health and social well-being. Obviously corporate
structures and policies are not the only determinants: public
policies, natural resources, soft and hard infrastructure, social and class relations, and geopolitical factors are impor-
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tant as well.
Hypothesis five: Despite some management literature
that foresees or proposes a contrary trend, TNCs have in
fact been consolidating global control of their operations at
head offices in their home country. Central control facilitates company-wide coordination of financing, production,
distribution, technical innovation, and marketing strategies
across all units of the business, rather than allowing each
national subsidiary to conduct these according to its own
idiosyncratic needs or preferences.
Hypothesis six: Consolidation of control within the
TNC's head office is facilitated by the relative absence of
geographic, cultural, linguistic, and legal-systemic barriers
between central decision-makers and their foreign subsidiaries. American-based TNCs with Canadian subsidiaries
encounter optimal conditions for consolidation.
Hypothesis seven: Consolidation of control, and other
manifestations of hollowing out, have changed not only the
site of corporate decision-making, but also its character and
consequences. As a result, Canadian governments, unions,
local businesses, and civic groups that must make arrangements with large and influential U.S.-based corporations
find it more difficult not only to catch their attention, but
also to persuade them to take account of Canadian law, policy, interests, or circumstances.
Hypothesis eight: The hollowing out of corporate Canada
may have adverse effects on everyone connected to it on the
food chain. Specifically, local providers of corporate support
services-the financial services industry, large law firms,
advertising firms, software designers, providers of industrial research, commercial real estate firms--confront declining markets for their services. And the "food chain" reaches
right down to include construction workers who might have
worked on high rise office towers that are never built, service workers in up-scale restaurants that are struggling for
lack of business, and salespersons in luxury shops with a
shrinking client base. The implications for local labor markets are serious indeed, especially in Canada's largest cities
where once-significant head office populations dwindled
considerably in the decade between 1985 and 1995, the high
point of the hollowing out phenomenon.
Hypothesis nine: In principle, the hollowing out effect
might be offset by the growth of indigenous Canadian
TNCs, but this has not so far happened to any great extent.

HOLLOWING OUT
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There are relatively few Canadian-based TNCs of any significant size; nor are they more likely to appear any time
soon. In fact to the contrary: hollowing out is likely to increase, not diminish.
Hypothesis ten: Because the world of work is largely regulated by "the law of the shop"-by the web of rule that
emerges in every workplace-one might expect that changes
in corporate structures and policies would become more
immediately and dramatically manifest in that domain rather than in the domain of state law. 5 This is likely true not
only in non-union workplaces, where management is the
sole or dominant author of the law of the shop, but also in
unionized workplaces where management is in principle
only a joint author with the union.
III. THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF HOLLOWING OUT ON
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND LABOR LAW

In common with their peers in most advanced countries,
"right thinking" members of Canada's elites-elected officials, civil servants, commentators, policy advisors, academics-have succumbed to "globalization of the mind."'6 In particular, a transnational consensus has held (at least until
recently) that deregulation of labor markets is essential for
the promotion of competitiveness and general prosperity.
While the specific modalities and outer limits of deregulation remain somewhat subject to debate, adherents of this
consensus view generally accept that the power of unions
should be curtailed, that labor standards should be made
more flexible, that the cost of pensions and other social entitlements should be reduced, and that workforce discipline
should be maintained.
Oddly, the idea that labor markets should be deregulated has gained widespread acceptance in parts of Canada's "hollowed out" business community, even though Canada's own experience suggests that collective bargaining
and high labor standards pose little threat to its growth,

15. See generally H.W. Arthurs, Labour Law Without the State?, 46 U.
TORONTO L.J. 1 (1996).

16. H.W. Arthurs, Globalization of the Mind. Canadian Elites and the
Restructuringof Legal Fields, 12 CAN. J.L. & Soc'y 219, 222 (1998).

790

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57

efficiency, or competitiveness. 7 Indeed, there is considerable
support in the same circles for the promotion of high performance workplace systems that provide expanded training
opportunities for workers, compensation policies that reward good performance, and enhanced job satisfaction
through the creation of quality circles and similar strategies
of worker self-management. 8
Why should the Canadian business community be so
committed to deregulatory policies despite evidence favoring
a contrary approach? In part, no doubt, it truly believes that
deregulation is in its own best interest. In part, however, it
has simply aligned itself with the dominant thinking at the
American head offices to which its members report, and
amongst its American customers, suppliers, and professional advisors. This alignment with the dominant assumptions
of their American "relevant other" is nothing new for Canadians. Business people and unionists, professionals and professors have all borrowed frequently from American policy
approaches and legislative models in the labor field. Notable
examples include the Wagner Act, occupational health and
safety laws, and laws against workplace discrimination and
harassment. This is hardly surprising. Many leading IR/HR
and labor law academics were educated at leading American
graduate schools; much of what they read and some of what
they write is published in American journals; Canadian labor scholars, courts, and boards frequently cite American
cases, studies, and articles; many of our legal and IR/HR
practitioners belong to American professional associations;
much of their work involves American-owned companies
and American-affiliated unions; and public understanding
of Canada's political economy is significantly influenced by
images and messages emanating from American media. The
United
States, to reiterate, is Canada's most relevant oth19
er.
17. See

HARRY ARTHURS, FED. LAB. STANDARDS REv., FAIRNESS AT WORK:

251-66 (2006), available at
http://www.hrsdc.gc.ca/eng/labour/employment-standards/fls/pdflfinal-report.pd
FEDERAL LABOUR STANDARDS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

f.
18. The debate in the literature on high performance workplace systems is
captured in BtLANGER ET AL., supranote 13, at 41-44.
19. I have reviewed the historical evidence in H.W. Arthurs, National
Traditions in Labor Law Scholarship: The Canadian Case, 23 CoMP. LAB. L. &
POL'Y J. 645 (2002).
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Thus, in an era of deregulation, an era when labor's
rights are being everywhere retrenched rather than enhanced, the wonder is not that the American example is influential in Canada, but that Canada has so far managed to
maintain significant elements of its own mildly progressive
labor law system. However, with our policy makers increasingly committed to the logic of globalization and regional
integration, with our professional and academic establishments increasingly aligned with the United States, and
with corporate Canada increasingly hollowed out, things
may be changing. There are subtle and not so subtle pressures to reengineer our labor law and industrial relations
systems so that they conform more closely to those of the
United States. That, we are told, is what we will have to do
if we wish to exploit our privileged location within the new
North American economic space. Given Canada's heavy dependence on foreign-especially American-trade and investment, these are pressures that no government will
lightly disregard.
Of course, the American model of deregulation is not the
only model being offered in this age of globalization. Some
commentators believe that a new transformative labor law
is emerging, based on universal human rights and core labor rights, and firmly embedded in the deep structures of
international and transnational law.2" They argue, indeed,
that the promulgation of broad aspirational standards by
United Nations agencies such as the International Labour
Organization, or in regional covenants such as the European Convention on Human Rights, represents our last best
hope for social justice in a globalized world.2 ' Others contend that, by focusing on the development of a body of "soft"
labor law, by promoting best practice by corporations and
encouraging them to undertake responsible self-regulation,
by engaging the moral conscience and market power of international civil society, we will somehow make the world

20. See, e.g., ROY J. ADAMS,

LABOUR LEFT OUT: CANADA'S FAILURE TO PROTECT

HUMAN RIGHT (2006); James Gross,
Worker Rights as Human Rights: Wagner Act Values and Moral Choices, 4 U.
PENN. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 479 (2002); Patrick Macklem, The Right to Bargain
Collectively in International Law: Workers' Right, Human Right, International
Right?, in LABOUR RIGHTS AS HUMAN RIGHTS 61, 61-84 (2005).
AND PROMOTE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AS A

21. See Macklem, supra note 20.
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safe for workers.22
These two approaches are closely related in one respect.
Given the relative weakness of transnational unions and
social movements,23 and the virtual absence of international
institutions with democratic accountability, legislative capacity, and enforcement powers, the international approach
seems to depend largely on corporations voluntarily bringing themselves into compliance with international labor
standards. Is this a fatal flaw? Will global corporations of
their own volition or under threat of moral censure stop insisting on deregulated labor markets, stop lowering their
labor costs by out-sourcing and off-shoring work, and stop
"union-proofing" their employees? I am doubtful that voluntary initiatives will ultimately bring fairness to the world's
workers-or indeed that they should.24 But more to the
point, even if self-regulation by employers was desirable
and efficacious, Canada would still confront a serious problem: many decision-makers with the ultimate authority to
modify corporate IR/HR policies and actions within Canada
are located outside the country.
I conclude, then, that until effective and accountable
transnational or international labor regimes begin to
emerge, or until employers voluntarily adopt more workerfriendly practices, Canada will have to make labor policy
and administer labor laws using its old, imperfect domestic
institutions and processes. The serious limitations of these
institutions and processes-given continental integration
and hollowing out-are what I will explore next. I will do
this by means of two scenarios.
The first has to do with efforts to persuade TNCs to
create or retain jobs in Canada. Negotiations concerning the
22. See Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of
Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319 (2005); Charles Sabel et al., Ratcheting
Labor Standards: Regulation for Continuous Improvement in the Global
Workplace, (Feb. 23, 2000), http://www2.law.columbia.edu/sabel/papers/
ratchPO.html.
23. See James Atleson, The Voyage of the Neptune Jade: The Perils and
Promises of TransnationalLabor Solidarity, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 85 (2004).
24. See Harry W. Arthurs, Private Ordering and Workers' Rights in the
Global Economy: Corporate Codes of Conduct as a Regime of Labour Market
Regulation, in LABOUR LAW IN AN ERA OF GLOBALIZATION (Joanne Conaghan et al.
eds., 2001), reprinted in ETHICS CODES, CORPORATIONS AND THE CHALLENGES OF
GLOBALIZATION

(Wesley Cragg ed., 2005).
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provision of infrastructure improvements, loan guarantees,
training grants, or other incentives might once have been
conducted between Canadian government officials and the
locally-based CEO of its subsidiary. The CEO in turn would
have reported to a Canadian board of directors comprising
influential Canadian bankers, lawyers, and investors. While
no doubt significant investment decisions would have been
subject to the approval of the parent company, the Canadian CEO and board would have been influential proponents of the proposed Canadian operation. Now, however,
the Canadian boards of many U.S.-based subsidiaries have
been effectively filled with mere placeholders and their
CEOs generally enjoy much-diminished autonomy.25 As a
result, the proposed Canadian plant enjoys no particular
advantage when the TNC's global board weighs up alternative sites in, say, Kentucky or China. To be sure, decisions
about opening or closing plants are largely driven by considerations of business advantage; but at least at the margins those decisions are the outcome of complex and dynamic negotiations within and outside the companynegotiations in which the absence of influential Canadian
voices represents a likely disadvantage.
How do new investment and plant closing decisions affect labor relations? On the one hand, large scale shifts in
investment patterns obviously affect the overall Canadian
labor market and therefore the aggregate power of Canadian unions and the wage levels of Canadian workers. This
became evident in the late 1980s to early 1990s, when following the initiation of the original Canada-U.S. Free Trade
Agreement, Ontario-the manufacturing heartland of Canada-lost some 230,000 manufacturing jobs;26 and it has become evident again during the past decade, with over
250,000 jobs lost so far,27 and many more losses in prospect.
25. See Arthurs, supra note 2.
26.

STATISTICS

ESTIMATES

(LFS),

CANADA,

CANSIM,

tbl.282-0008,

BY NORTH AMERICAN

INDUSTRY

LABOUR

FORCE

SURVEY

CLASSIFICATION

SYSTEM

(NAICS), http://estat.statcan.ca(search "E-STAT' for "282-0008"; then narrow
fields to "Ontario," "Employment," "Manufacturing," "Both sexes," "15 years and
over," "1988" to "1993").
27. An analysis of Canada's labour force statistics by Erin Weir of the
Progressive Economics Forum puts Ontario manufacturing job loss between
November 2002 and November 2008 at 250,800 jobs-a decline of 22.5%.
Posting of Erin Weir to The Progressive Economics Forum, Ontario's
Manufacturing Crisis, http://www.progressive-economics.ca/2008/12/11/ontario-
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On the other, at the level of the individual firm, unions and
workers now know that having a positive relationship with
local management may not mean very much, given that crucial decisions are going to be taken by distant decision makers at the U.S. head office with little or no Canadian input.
That knowledge makes workers nervous. Sometimes they
react by becoming quiescent; sometimes they become militant; but in either event, the shift in the locus of corporate
decision making may alter the labor-management dynamic
quite significantly.
My second scenario has to do with the way Canadian
labor law is made. Until the 1990s, labor legislation-in Ontario at least-was generally enacted after careful study by
experts and the search for consensus amongst government,
management, and labor stakeholders. However, with continental integration there is no longer much call for distinctive Canadian expertise; and with hollowing out, there is no
longer much of a management community to consense with.
Moreover, with the growing risk of disinvestment, labor has
lost much of its ability to influence public policy; and with
labor's declining influence, Canadian governments have
largely lost their appetite for progressive labor legislation.
Worse yet, governments have even sought to overcome the
effects of labor board decisions unfavorable to TNCs by
enacting legislation to retroactively undo their effects" or by
marginally less blatant strategies such as directing labor
boards to reach different decisions, purging them of recalcitrant members, or stripping them of resources and powers.29
manufacturing-crisis/ (Dec. 11, 2008). Indeed, from November 2007 to May
2008, employment dropped by 8.3% in this sector. See STATISTICS CANADA, supra
note 26, at tbl.282-0088. Andrew Jackson suggests that in November 2008
alone, Ontario lost 42,000 manufacturing jobs. Posting of Andrew Jackson to
The
Progressive
Economics Forum,
Ontario Falls Off a
Cliff,
http://www.progressive-economics.ca/2008/12/05/ontario-falls-off-a-cliff/ (Dec. 5,
2008); see also CENSUS SNAPSHOT: CANADA'S CHANGING LABOUR FORCE, 2006
CENSUS, CANADIAN SOC. TRENDS, (2008), available at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/
pub/11-008-x/2008001/article/10575-eng.pdf.
28. The practice is not frequent, but for two well-documented instances see
Brian Langille, The Michelin Amendment in Context, 6 DALHOUSIE L.J. 523, 52442 (1981), and Eric Tucker, Wal-Mart and the Remaking of OntarioLabour Law,
INT'L UNION RTS., vol. 2, issue 2, 2005, at 10.
29. Harry Arthurs, Who's Afraid of Globalization?Reflections on the Future of
Labour Law, in GLOBALIZATION AND THE FUTURE OF LABOUR LAw 51, 58 (John
D.R. Craig & S. Michael Lynk eds., 2006).
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Thus, hollowing out attributable to continental economic integration and changes in the governance structures of
TNCs appears to have altered the content and administration of Canadian labor law, as well as the means by which it
is made and, ultimately, its symbolic and practical effects.
Finally, changes in the corporate structure of TNCs may
affect labor-management relations in the workplaces of
their Canadian subsidiaries. Given the diminished corporate autonomy of those subsidiaries, many of them are managed locally by senior executives who are posted to Canada
for fairly short periods, and then reassigned to other countries or to a more senior position at the international head
office. In some cases, these executives arrive in Canada with
specific orders to cut costs, resist unionization, or institute
working practices, without regard to Canadian law or local
custom.3" In many others, they arrive with little feel for the
dynamic of Canadian labor relations, labor law, or local
shop-floor practices. In either case, it seems probable that
transient executives with no local experience and no prospects of a long-term career in Canada are less likely to internalize the values of Canada's industrial relations and
labor law systems than senior corporate officials who reside
more or less permanently in Canada.3
As I have already indicated, these values are somewhat
different from American values. There is a greater acceptance of collective bargaining in Canada, for example, which
arguably might shape the strategies Canadian-based managers adopt during organizing campaigns, the way they behave at the bargaining table, their reaction to strikes, and
what they say to the media about unions.32 Different values
are also deeply embedded in the legal structures and doctrines of our two countries. Take the default position con30. It is by no means unknown for foreign-based TNCs to send executives or
lawyers from their head office to Canada to deal with labor disputes over the
heads of local management. See, e.g., United Steelworkers of Am. v. Radio
Shack, [1980] 1 Can. L.R.B.R. 99; United Steelworkers of Am. v. Wal-Mart Can.
Inc., [1997] O.L.R.B. Jan.-Feb. 141 (Can.).
31. See BIkLANGER ET AL., supranote 13, at 46-48.
32. See, e.g., John Logan, How 'Anti-Union" Laws Saved Canadian Labour:
Certification and Striker Replacements in Post-War Industrial Relations, 57
RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES / INDUS. REL. 129 (2002) (Can.). But see Ishak Saporta
& Bryan Lincoln, Managers'and Workers'Attitudes Toward Unions in the U.S.
and Canada, 50 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES / INDUS. REL. 550 (1995) (Can.).
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cerning contracts of employment. In the United States,
people are presumed to be employed at will; in Canada, they
cannot be dismissed without reasonable notice.33 These
baseline positions must surely affect hiring practices and
HR policies, and perhaps as well the attitudes of Canadian
workers towards job security.
To be fair, evidence on this point is somewhat equivocal.
On the one hand, it is widely believed that when Canadian
firms are taken over by American TNCs, acquire Americanbased managers, or fall more directly under the control of
their American parent firm, labor-management relations
tend to deteriorate. On the other, some evidence suggests
that American-based head office managers seldom intervene
directly in routine IR/HR functions at their Canadian
branch plants. How to reconcile these two observations?
One possibility is that a mandate from head office to improve the subsidiary's "bottom line" will generate sufficient
pressure on local management that no more explicit forms
of intervention are required: local managers know that to
achieve their financial objectives, they must adopt leaner
staffing policies, sterner work practices, and tougher bargaining positions. Another is that local managers are carefully trained to adhere to the IR/HR philosophy of the American parent firm-including, all too often, union avoidance;
that they are provided with detailed "scripts" they must follow if unions appear; that they are suitably rewarded for
adhering to the parent firm's philosophy; and that consequently there is no need for more intrusive action by head
office. A third is that while head office intervention is unlikely in routine matters, it is much more so when labor difficulties in Canada have the potential to engender a crisis,
set a precedent, or incur financial costs that would affect
American operations. Whatever the explanation, it is entirely plausible that hollowing out may contribute to, and in
some cases directly cause, the convergence of IR/HR policies
and practices as between the parent TNC and its Canadian
subsidiary.
33. See Roy J. Adams et al., Discipline and Discharge in Canada and the
United States, 41 LAB. L.J. 596 (1990); Randall Scott Echlin, From Master and
Servant to Bardal and Beyond: 200 Years of Employment Law in Ontario, 18072007, ADVOCATES' SOC'Y J., Winter 2007, at 11; Jay M. Feinman, The
Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 118-35
(1976).
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But "plausible" is not the same as "proven." We need to
know much more about how American subsidiaries in Canada organize their IR/HR functions, how much autonomy
they allow to their locally-based managers, how they respond to advice from local professional advisors,34 and how
these arrangements actually affect workplace relations.
IV. THE FUTURE OF HOLLOWING OUT: FORCES WORKING
AGAINST FURTHER INTEGRATION OF CANADIAN AND AMERICAN
LABOR LAW

However, even if research confirms my hypothesisthat the hollowing out of corporate Canada generates pressures that are changing Canadian IR/HR practices and Canadian labor law-it does not follow inevitably that Canadian workplaces will become indistinguishable from those in
the United States. The forces of continental integration are
not the only forces at work. Contrary tendencies can be detected as well.
The first of these is growing ambivalence within Canada corporate elites concerning the advantages of hollowing
out. While continuing to acknowledge the benefits of globalization and North American integration, some business and
financial leaders have begun to realize that the new dispensation may have disadvantages as well. The comparative
advantage they derive from their Canadian knowledge and
connections may be a wasting asset; their proposals for significant Canada-based business initiatives are sometimes
given short shrift by U.S. head offices or U.S. investors; and
they may not welcome the prospect of having to relocate to
the United States in order to build their businesses or advance their careers. The extent and intensity of this sentiment are not yet clear; nor is it clear what, if anything,
those who share it might do to change their situation.
34. For a study of the role played by labor lawyers in advising their TNC
clients in Canada and other countries, see Harry Arthurs, The Role of Global
Law Firms in Constructing or Obstructing a Transitional Regime of Labour
Law, in RULES AND NETWORKS: THE LEGAL CULTURE OF GLOBAL BUSINESS

TRANSACTIONS 273 (Richard P. Appelbaum et al. eds., 2001) (this author notes
that ' Transitional" should be 'Transnational"). For a different perspective, see
Susan Bisom-Rapp, Exceeding our Boundaries:TransnationalEmployment Law
Practiceand the Export of American Lawyering Styles to the Global Worksite, 25
CoMP. LAB. L. & POLY J. 257 (2004).
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One option would be for the business community to renew the implicit Canadian social contract of the 1950s and
1960s. This contract, in effect, helped Canadian business by
providing decent infrastructure and ensuring a positive social environment, while protecting it from foreign competition or-in the case of the automobile industry-managing
trade so as to ensure favorable terms for both Canadian
companies and subsidiaries of foreign firms operating in
Canada.35 In exchange, workers received the benefits of a
welfare state, and of reasonably robust labor legislation.
This arrangement worked to the mutual advantage of
labor and management and for the general good as well.
Canada's universal, publicly-funded health care system relieved auto manufacturers of the significant financial burden of providing private health insurance to their unionized
Canadian workers; and Canada's strong public education
systems produced well-educated workers who could be
trained at lower cost and would achieve higher productivity
than their U.S. counterparts. As a result, despite the fact
that the Canadian Auto Workers secured collective agreements that were often more favorable than those negotiated
by its American counterpart, the UAW, Ontario for some
years produced more automobiles than any American state.
(That distinction has recently passed to Mexico.) However,
while renewal of this social contract might conceivably preserve or restore Canada's competitive advantage,36 and resuscitate its business community, it is not being seriously
advocated by leading elements of that community.
Another force working against further hollowing out in
Canada, and further convergence of U.S. and Canadian labor policies and practices, is that American business has
been revealed as suffering from serious structural weakness, and American government from a failure of regulatory
35. For matters relating to the implementation of the Agreement Concerning
Automotive Products, see 19 U.S.C. § 2011 (2006). See also PRADEEP KUMAR &
JOHN HOLMES, CHANGE, BUT IN WHAT DIRECTION? DIVERGENT UNION RESPONSES
TO WORK RESTRUCTURING IN THE INTEGRATED NORTH AMERICAN AUTO INDUSTRY

(1993); Pradeep Kumar & John Holmes, Continuity and Change: Evolving
Human Resource Policies and Practices in the CanadianAutomobile Industry,
QUEEN'S PAPERS INDUS. REL. [Q.P.I.R.] 1 (1996) (Can.).
36. See ARTHURS, supra note 17. For a review of the literature, see Bernard
Adell, On Paradigms and Platforms: Approaches to Regulating Labour
Standards in the New Economy (2006) (unpublished study) (on file with author).
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imagination and performance. These compounding crises
have produced several effects. The first is that for fear of
importing America's severe difficulties, Canadians may become less susceptible to "globalization of the mind" which,
as I earlier suggested, has often predisposed them to the
views of their neo-liberal American counterparts. The
second is that with the advent of a new administration in
Washington, America's labor and social policies may come to
more closely resemble those of Canada.37 That is certainly
the hope and expectation of many of supporters of President
Obama and the Democratic Party. At a minimum, in light of
recent experience, America's long-running experiment in
the deregulation of labor and other markets is unlikely to
continue. And the third is that recent American domestic
crises, coupled with ongoing security concerns and nativist
anti-immigrant sentiment, have led to a thickening of the
Canada-U.S. border, and to increased resistance by significant elements in the United States to the easy movement of
people, goods, and services across that border-all of which
are likely to interfere with continental economic integration.
If indeed this latter prediction holds true, American
protectionism might well lead to a diminished presence of
U.S.-based TNCs in Canada. This would reverse the effects
of the hollowing out of corporate Canada, and leave a greater proportion of Canadian employers and their workers with
the opportunity to resolve their differences free from head
office control and American influence, and in accordance
with Canadian laws, practices, and values. However, they
would likely be doing so in the shadow of dramatic restructuring of a Canadian economy struggling to cope with the
withdrawal of American capital, diminished availability of
American trade secrets and technology, and reduced access
to American markets. These would not be optimal conditions in which to attempt to reestablish Canada's postwar
37. Compare Michele Campolieti et al., Labor Law Reform and the Role of
Delay in Union Organizing:EmpiricalEvidence from Canada, 61 INi)uS. & LAB.
REL. REV. 32 (2007), with Rafael Gely & Timothy D. Chandler, Card Check
Recognition: New House Rules for Union Organizing?, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J.
247 (2008), and Meghan Brooke Phillips, Using the Employee Free Choice Act as
Duct Tape: How Both Active and Passive Deregulation of Labor Law Make the
EFCA an Improper Mechanism for Remedying Working Class Americans'
Problems, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 219 (2008), and James Gray Pope et al., The
Employee Free Choice Act and a Long-Term Strategy for Winning Workers'
Rights, 11 J. LAB. & Soc'y 125 (2008).
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social contract.
A final counter-tendency to hollowing out is rooted in
the dawning recognition by the "defiant publics" of many
countries-those of Canada and the United States included-that a "hollowed out" world in which corporations
are everywhere present, but nowhere accountable, is a
world fraught with dangers.38 Jim Atleson's Voyage of the
Neptune Jade is an example of how "defiant" working people
might somehow be able to reach across national boundaries
and beyond national law in order to act in solidarity to defend themselves against such dangers.39 On the other hand,
solidaristic action is difficult to sustain across space and
time, as Atleson acknowledges. Workers in different countries have competing, as well as complementary, interests;
"defiant publics" may become quiescent unless they can
translate their critique of the status quo into a positive,
long-term program of social and economic reform. What is
needed, then, is not just solidarity, not just defiance, but a
new regulatory architecture. And that architecture will
somehow have to acknowledge the unique and consequential structure of TNCs, the actors whose conduct it would be
primarily designed to constrain.
CONCLUSION

Seen in light of these counter-tendencies, the "hollowing
out of corporate Canada" turns out to be neither about a
particular Canadian problem, nor about the way in which
TNCs govern themselves, nor even about the possible effects
of corporate governance on labor law, policy, and practice. It
is a phenomenon that confronts all advanced economies,
that implicates public as well as private governance, and
that affects all social and economic relations, not just those
unique to the workplace. In short, to borrow Atleson's
phrase, the "values and assumptions" of Canadian labor law
are embedded in the foundations of contemporary American
capitalism and secreted in the DNA of U.S.-based transnational corporations, its unique institutional expression and
most powerful agents. Those assumptions are therefore vulnerable to destabilization by the traumatic changes that
38. See DANIEL DRACHE, DEFIANT PUBLICS: THE UNPRECEDENTED REACH OF
THE GLOBAL CITIZEN (2008).
39. Atleson, supra note 23.
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that form of capitalism and those corporations are now experiencing.

